Propositional Attitudes

An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them

Mark Richard (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

288 Seiten

1990
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-38819-1 (ISBN)

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This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues in the philosophy of mind are addressed. Though intended primarily for professional philosophers and graduate students the book will also interest cognitive scientists and linguists.

Acknowledgements Part I. Structure: 1. Structureless propositions 2. Structured intensions 3. The structure of propositions 4. The sorts of sententialism 5. Tacit beliefs 2. SOME COGNITIVE THEORIES OF CONTENT 1. A problem for Fregeanism 2. An obvious solution reconsidered 3. Sense and similarity 4. Conceptual role 5. Conclusion 3. ASCRIBING ATTITUDES 1. Russellianism 2. Saying what others think 3. Worries about words 4. Applications and amplifications 4. SOME ISSUES IN LOGIC AND SEMANTICS 1. Quantification and Leibniz's law 2. Deomonstratives and reflexivity 3. Belief retention 4. Truth and RAMs 5. Reference and content Conclusion Bibliography Index.

Erscheint lt. Verlag	23.2.1990
Reihe/Serie	Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Zusatzinfo	9 Line drawings, unspecified
Verlagsort	Cambridge
Sprache	englisch
Maße	140 x 214 mm
Gewicht	370 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie
ISBN-10	0-521-38819-8 / 0521388198
ISBN-13	978-0-521-38819-1 / 9780521388191
Zustand	Neuware