Simply Responsible
Basic Blame, Scant Praise, and Minimal Agency
Seiten
2023
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-288359-9 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-288359-9 (ISBN)
Matt King presents a radical new account of responsibility according to which moral responsibility should be understood in the same way as other kinds of responsibility. We are responsible for the things we do first, then blameworthy or praiseworthy for having done them in light of whether they're good or bad, according to a variety of standards.
We evaluate people all the time for a wide variety of activities. We blame them for miscalculations, uninspired art, and committing crimes. We praise them for detailed brushwork, a superb pass, and their acts of kindness. We accomplish things, from solving crosswords to mastering guitar solos. We bungle our endeavors, whether this is letting a friend down or burning dinner. Sometimes these deeds are morally significant, but many times they are not.
Simply Responsible defends the radical proposal that the blameworthy artist is responsible in just the same way that the blameworthy thief is. We can be responsible for all kinds of different activities, from lip-synching to long division, from murders to meringues, but the relation involved, what author Matt King calls the basic responsibility relation, is the same in every case. We are responsible for the things we do first, then blameworthy or praiseworthy for having done them in light of whether they're good or bad, according to a variety of standards.
Why is this a radical proposal? Firstly, because so much of the contemporary literature on moral responsibility has moralized its nature. According to most accounts, moral responsibility is either a special species of responsibility or else depends on moralized capacities. In contrast, King argues that we get a more complete and unifying picture of responsible agency from a more general theory of responsibility. Secondly, the proposal is radical due to its drastic simplicity. King foregoes many of the complications that feature in other accounts of responsibility, arguing that we can make do with less demanding theoretical elements.
We evaluate people all the time for a wide variety of activities. We blame them for miscalculations, uninspired art, and committing crimes. We praise them for detailed brushwork, a superb pass, and their acts of kindness. We accomplish things, from solving crosswords to mastering guitar solos. We bungle our endeavors, whether this is letting a friend down or burning dinner. Sometimes these deeds are morally significant, but many times they are not.
Simply Responsible defends the radical proposal that the blameworthy artist is responsible in just the same way that the blameworthy thief is. We can be responsible for all kinds of different activities, from lip-synching to long division, from murders to meringues, but the relation involved, what author Matt King calls the basic responsibility relation, is the same in every case. We are responsible for the things we do first, then blameworthy or praiseworthy for having done them in light of whether they're good or bad, according to a variety of standards.
Why is this a radical proposal? Firstly, because so much of the contemporary literature on moral responsibility has moralized its nature. According to most accounts, moral responsibility is either a special species of responsibility or else depends on moralized capacities. In contrast, King argues that we get a more complete and unifying picture of responsible agency from a more general theory of responsibility. Secondly, the proposal is radical due to its drastic simplicity. King foregoes many of the complications that feature in other accounts of responsibility, arguing that we can make do with less demanding theoretical elements.
Matt King is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, where he thinks and writes about responsibility and other related topics in ethics and law. His work has been published in over a dozen journals and edited volumes, and is even occasionally cited. He is co-editor of Agency in Mental Disorder (OUP, 2022).
Preface
Introduction: A General Theory of Responsibility
1: The Basic Responsibility Relation
2: Basic Agency
3: Basic Blame and Basic Praise
4: Basic Desert
5: Beyond Basic Responsibility
Conclusion: Odds & Ends
| Erscheinungsdatum | 10.07.2023 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 145 x 223 mm |
| Gewicht | 392 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-288359-3 / 0192883593 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-288359-9 / 9780192883599 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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