Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
Wiley-Blackwell (Verlag)
978-1-119-53097-8 (ISBN)
In Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker outline and address the conceptual confusions encountered in various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The result of a collaboration between an esteemed philosopher and a distinguished neuroscientist, this remarkable volume presents an interdisciplinary critique of many of the neuroscientific and psychological foundations of modern cognitive neuroscience. The authors point out conceptual entanglements in a broad range of major neuroscientific and psychological theories—including those of such neuroscientists as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Libet, Penrose, Posner, Raichle and Tononi, as well as psychologists such as Baar, Frith, Glynn, Gregory, William James, Weiskrantz, and biologists such as Dawkins, Humphreys, and Young. Confusions arising from the work of philosophers such as Dennett, Chalmers, Churchland, Nagel and Searle are subjected to detailed criticism. These criticisms are complemented by constructive analyses of the major cognitive, cogitative, emotional and volitional attributes that lie at the heart of cognitive neuroscientific research.
Now in its second edition, this groundbreaking work has been exhaustively revised and updated to address current issues and critiques. New discussions offer insight into functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the notions of information and representation, conflict monitoring and the executive, minimal states of consciousness, integrated information theory and global workspace theory. The authors also reply to criticisms of the fundamental arguments posed in the first edition, defending their conclusions regarding mereological fallacy, the necessity of distinguishing between empirical and conceptual questions, the mind-body problem, and more. Essential as both a comprehensive reference work and as an up-to-date critical review of cognitive neuroscience, this landmark volume:
Provides a scientifically and philosophically informed survey of the conceptual problems in a wide variety of neuroscientific theories
Offers a clear and accessible presentation of the subject, minimizing the use of complex philosophical and scientific jargon
Discusses how the ways the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of neuroscientific research
Includes fresh insights on mind-body and mind-brain relations, and on the relation between the notion of person and human being
Features more than 100 new pages and a wealth of additional diagrams, charts, and tables
Continuing to challenge and educate readers like no other book on the subject, the second edition of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is required reading not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also for academics, researchers, and students involved in the study of the mind and consciousness.
M. R. Bennett AO is Emeritus Professor of Neuroscience and University Chair at the University of Sydney, Founding Director of the Brain and Mind Research Institute, and Chair of the Mind and Neuroscience-Thompson Institute. He is the author and co-author of numerous books, including The Idea of Consciousness, History of the Synapse, History of Cognitive Neuroscience, and Stress, Trauma and Synaptic Plasticity. He is past President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience and of the Australian Neuroscience Society. P.M.S. Hacker is Emeritus Research Fellow at St John’s College, Oxford, and holds an Honorary Professorship at University College, London at the Institute of Neurology. He is author and co-author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. His works include Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, The Intellectual Powers, The Passions, The Moral Powers, and the landmark seven-volume Analytic Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
Foreword to the Second Edition by Denis Noble xvii
Foreword to the First Edition by Denis Noble xx
Acknowledgements to the Second Edition xxiii
Acknowledgements to the First Edition xxiv
Introduction to the First Edition 1
Introduction to the Second Edition 8
Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots 15
Preliminaries to Part I 17
1 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical Roots 17
2 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Conceptual Roots 20
1 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System 21
1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine 22
1.2 Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine 32
1.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and Its Aftermath 38
1.4 The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall 41
1.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig 46
1.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington 48
1.6.1 The dependence of psychological capacities on the functioning of cortex: localization determined non-invasively by Ogawa and Sokolof 49
1.6.2 Caveats concerning the use of fMRI to determine the areas of cortex involved in supporting psychological powers 52
2 The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and His Protégés 56
2.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact 56
2.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism 60
2.3 John Eccles and the ‘Liaison Brain’ 62
2.4 Wilder Penfield and the ‘Highest Brain Mechanism’ 69
3 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience 79
3.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience 79
(Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird)
3.2 Challenging the Consensus: The Brain Is Not the Subject of Psychological Attributes 81
(Greenfield)
3.3 Qualms Concerning Ascription of a Mereological Fallacy to Neuroscience 85
(Ullman, Blakemore, Gregory, Dennett, Searle)
3.4 Replies to Objections 87
(Ullman, Crick, Young, Zeki, Milner, Squire and Kandel, Gregory, Marr, Frisby, Sperry and Gazzaniga, Blakemore, Searle, Dennett)
4 An Overview of the Conceptual Field of Cognitive Neuroscience: Evidence, the Inner, Introspection, Privileged Access, Privacy and Subjectivity 94
4.1 On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being 95
4.2 On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity 99
(Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick)
4.3 The Inner 103
(Damasio)
4.4 Introspection 104
(Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz)
4.5 Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect 106
(Blakemore)
4.6 Privacy or Subjectivity 108
(Searle)
4.7 The Meaning of Psychological Predicates: How They Are Explained and Learned 111
4.8 Of the Mind and Its Nature 117
(Gazzaniga, Doty)
Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis 121
Preliminaries to Part II 123
1 Brain–Body Dualism 123
(Searle)
2 The Project 125
3 The Category of the Psychological 129
5 Sensation and Perception 133
5.1 Sensation 133
(Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)
5.2 Perception 137
(Crick)
5.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities 140
(Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)
5.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz 146
(Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young)
5.2.3 Visual images and the binding problem 148
(Sherrington, Damasio, Edelman, Crick, Kandel and Wurtz, Gray and Singer, Barlow)
5.2.4 Perception as information processing: Marr’ s theory of vision 154
(Marr, Frisby, Crick, Ullman)
6 The Cognitive Powers 159
6.1 Knowledge and Its Kinship with Ability 159
6.1.1 Ability and know-how 162
6.1.2 Possessing knowledge and containing knowledge 163
(LeDoux, Young, Zeki, Blakemore, Crick, Gazzaniga)
6.2 Memory 166
(Milner, Squire and Kandel)
6.2.1 Declarative and non-declarative memory 168
(Milner, Squire and Kandel)
6.2.2 Storage, retention and memory traces 171
(LeDoux, Squire and Kandel; Gazzaniga, Mangun and Ivry; James, Köhler, Glynn; Bennett, Gibson and Robinson; Damasio)
7 The Cogitative Powers 185
7.1 Belief 185
(Crick)
7.2 Thinking 187
7.3 Imagination and Mental Images 193
(Blakemore, Posner and Raichle, Shepard)
7.3.1 The logical features of mental imagery 200
(Galton, Richardson, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Finke, Luria, Shepard, Meudell, Betts, Marks, Shepard and Metzler, Cooper and Shepard, Posner and Raichle)
8 Emotion 212
8.1 Affections 212
(Rolls, Damasio)
8.2 The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey 217
8.2.1 Neuroscientists’ confusions 223
(LeDoux, Barrett, Damasio, James)
8.2.2 Analysis of the emotions 232
9 Volition and Voluntary Movement 239
9.1 Volition 239
9.2 Libet’ s Theory of Voluntary Movement and Its Progeny 244
(Kornhuber and Deecke, Libet, Frith et al.; Fifel; Haggard; Filevich et al.; Frith et al.)
9.3 Refutations and Clarifications 247
9.4 Conflict-Monitoring and the Executive 251
(Verbruggen and Logan; Botvinik, Braver, Barch, Carter and Cohen; Shenhav; Power and Petersen)
9.5 Man and Machine: Doing Something Like an Automaton, Automatically, Mechanically, from Force of Habit 256
9.6 Taking Stock 258
Part III Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis 263
10 Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness 265
10.1 Consciousness and the Brain 265
(Albright; Jessell; Kandel and Posner; Edelman and Tononi; Glynn; Greenfield; Lliná; Gazzaniga; Dehaene; Searle; Johnson-Laird; Chalmer; Frith and Rees; Dennett; Gregory; Crick and Koch; Glynn; Frisby; Boly)
10.2 Intransitive Consciousness and Awareness 270
10.2.1 Minimal states of consciousness or responsiveness 271
(Giacin; Boly; Owen and Coleman; Nachev; Arat and Rosenkrantz; Searle; Dennett)
10.3 Transitive Consciousness and Its Forms 278
(Rosenthal)
10.3.1 A partial analysis 283
11 Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia, Neural Correlates of Consciousness 292
11.1 Extending the Concept of Consciousness 292
(Libet; Baar; Crick; Edelman; Tononi; Searle; Chalmers)
11.2 Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States
(Rosenthal) 294
11.2.1 Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain 299
(Searle; Baars; Chalmers; Glynn; Damasio; Edelman and Tononi)
11.3 Qualia 301
(Searle; Chalmers; Glynn; Damasio; Edelman and Tononi; Nagel; Dennett)
11.3.1 ‘How it feels’ to have an experience 304
(Block; Searle; Edelman and Tononi; Chalmers)
11.3.2 Of there being something which it is like … 307
(Nagel)
11.3.3 The qualitative character of experience 311
11.3.4 Thises and thuses 312
(Chalmers; Crick)
11.3.5 Of the communicability and describability of qualia 314
(Nagel; Edelman; Glynn; Sperry)
12 Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory 322
12.1 The Integrated Information Theory of Tononi 322
(Tononi, Boly, Massimini and Koch; Esser, Hill and Tononi; Siclari; Alkire, Hudetz and Tononi; Hyder, Rothman and Bennett; Casali; Ferrarelli)
12.1.1 Axiomatizing Integrated Information Theory 326
(Tononi)
12.1.2 The ambiguity of ‘information’ 328
(Tononi)
12.1.3 Unclarities about experience again 329
(Tononi)
12.2 Global Workspace Theory 330
(Baars, Dehaene)
12.2.1 Analysis of Dehaene’ s example 332
(Mashour, Dehaene et al.; Lau; Kouider)
12.2.2 On Dehaene’ s misconceptions of consciousness and information processing 334
(Dehaene; Shannon)
12.3 On Finding One’ s Way through a Conceptual Jungle with Worthless Tools 336
(Crick and Koch; Bennett; Shannon and Weaver; Hubel and Wiesel; Chang and Tsao; Quiroga)
12.4 What Is Necessary for Neural Correlation 338
(Bennett, Hatton, Hermens and Lagopoulos; O’Keefe, Dostrovsky)
12.5 Where to Find the Explanations 342
(Schmidhuber)
13 Puzzles about Consciousness 345
13.1 A Budget of Puzzles 345
13.2 On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with Our Conception of an Objective Reality 346
(Searle; Chalmers; Dennett; Penrose)
13.3 On the Question of How Physical Processes Can Give Rise to Conscious Experience 354
(Huxley; Tyndall; Humphrey; Glynn; Edelman; Damasio; Bennett, Hatton, Hermens, Lagopoulos; Damasio)
13.4 Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness 359
(Chalmers; Barlow; Penrose; Humphrey; Searle)
13.5 The Problem of Awareness 366
(Johnson-Laird; Blakemore)
13.6 Other Minds and Other Animals 367
(Crick; Edelman; Weiskrantz; Baars; Frith)
14 Self-Consciousness and Selves, Thought and Language 373
14.1 Self-Consciousness and the Self 373
14.2 Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James 374
14.3 Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness 378
(Baars; Damasio; Edelman; Humphrey; Blakemore; Johnson-Laird)
14.4 The Illusion of a ‘Self ’ 381
(Damasio, Humphrey, Blakemore)
14.5 The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection 384
14.5.1 Thought and language 387
(Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Galton, Penrose)
14.6 Self-Consciousness 390
(Edelman,Penrose)
15 Concepts, Thinking and Speaking 396
15.1 Concepts and Concept Possession 396
(Mashour, Roelfsema, Changeux and Dehaene; Zeithamova et al.; Bowman; Bruner, Goodnow and Austin; Rosch; Medin and Schaffer)
15.1.1 Beginning again 399
(Bowman and Zeithamova; Medin and Schaffer; Nosofsky)
15.2 Concept Possession as Mastery of the Use of an Expression 404
(Edelman and Tononi)
15.3 What Do We Think In? 407
(Einstein; Galton, Hadamard, Penrose)
Part IV On Method 413
16 Reductionism 415
16.1 Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism 415
(Crick, Blakemore)
16.2 Reduction by Elimination 426
(P. M. and P. S. Churchland)
16.2.1 Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical? 427
(P. M. Churchland)
16.2.2 Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? 430
(P. M. Churchland)
16.2.3 Eliminating all that is human 432
(P. M. and P. S. Churchland, Dawkins)
16.2.4 Sawing off the branch on which one sits 435
17 Methodological Reflections 437
17.1 Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation 438
(P. S. Churchland)
17.2 The ‘Poverty of English’ Argument 445
(Blakemore)
17.3 From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy 447
(Crick, Sperry, Gazzaniga, Wolford, Miller and Gazzaniga, Doty, Pinto, Volz)
17.3.1 The case of blindsight: misdescription and illusory explanation 453
(Weiskrantz; Beltramo and Scanziani)
17.4 Philosophy and Neuroscience 456
(Glynn, Edelman, Edelman and Tononi, Crick, Zeki)
17.4.1 What philosophy can and what it cannot do 459
17.4.2 What neuroscience can and what it cannot do 465
(Crick, Edelman, Zeki)
17.5 Why It Matters 468
Appendices
Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett 470
1 Dennett’ s Methodology and Presuppositions 471
2 The Intentional Stance 476
3 Heterophenomenological Method 483
4 Consciousness 487
Appendix 2 John Searle 492
1 Philosophy and Science 493
2 Searle’ s Philosophy of Mind 499
3 Unified Field Theory 504
4 The Traditional Mind–Body Problem 506
Appendix 3 Further Replies to Critics 510
1 The Mereological Principle 511
(Burgos and Donahue; Dainton; van Buuren)
2 Essentialism 515
(Burgos and Donahue)
3 A Priorism: Empirical Learning Theory or the Nature of Primitive Language-Games 516
(Smith)
4 Criteria and Constitutive Evidence 518
(Smith)
5 Foundationalism, Linguistic Conservatism, Conceptual Change, Connective Analysis, Tolerating Inconsistencies and Post-Modernism 519
(Keestra and Cowley)
Afterword to the Second Edition by Anthony Kenny 524
Index 526
| Erscheinungsdatum | 26.11.2021 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Hoboken |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 170 x 241 mm |
| Gewicht | 975 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie | |
| Schlagworte | Cognitive Psychology • cognitive science • Geistesphilosophie • Kognitionswissenschaft • Kognitive Psychologie • Neurowissenschaften • Philosophie • Philosophy • Philosophy of mind • Psychologie • Psychology |
| ISBN-10 | 1-119-53097-0 / 1119530970 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-119-53097-8 / 9781119530978 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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