Power Shifts
University of Chicago Press (Verlag)
978-0-226-79783-0 (ISBN)
The emergence of the modern presidency in the first half of the twentieth century transformed the American government. But surprisingly, presidents were not the primary driving force of this change—it was Congress. Through a series of statutes, lawmakers endorsed presidential leadership in the legislative process and augmented the chief executive’s organizational capacities.
But why did Congress grant presidents this power? In Power Shifts, John A. Dearborn shows that legislators acted on the idea of presidential representation. Congress subordinated its own claims to stand as the nation’s primary representative institution and designed reforms that assumed the president, selected by the country rather than states or districts, was the superior steward of national interest. In the process, Congress recast the nation’s chief executive as its chief representative.
As Dearborn demonstrates, the full extent to which Congress’s reforms rested on the idea of presidential representation was revealed when that notion’s validity was thrown into doubt. In the 1970s, Congress sought to restore its place in a rebalanced system, but legislators also found that their earlier success at institutional reinvention constrained their efforts to reclaim authority. Chronicling the evolving relationship between the presidency and Congress across a range of policy areas, Power Shifts exposes a fundamental dilemma in an otherwise proud tradition of constitutional adaptation.
John A. Dearborn is a postdoctoral associate and lecturer at Yale University, holding appointments in the Center for the Study of Representative Institutions at the MacMillan Center, the Policy Lab at the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, and the Department of Political Science. He is the coauthor of Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic: The Deep State and the Unitary Executive.
Preface Rethinking a Political Truism
1 Introduction: Legislating Presidential Power
2 Ideas and Political Development
Part I Institutional Choice: Creating the Institutional Presidency, 1910–49[TN1]
3 Presidential Budgeting
4 Presidential Economic Policymaking
5 Presidential Reorganization Authority
6 Presidential National Security Authority
Part II Institutional Durability: Reconsidering the Institutional Presidency, 1970–84
7 Congressional Pushback against Presidential Budgeting
8 Congressional Pushback against Presidential Economic Policymaking
9 Congressional Pushback against Presidential Reorganization Authority
10 Congressional Pushback against Presidential National Security Authority
11 Conclusion: Ideas and the Politics of Adaptability
Acknowledgments
Notes
Index
| Erscheinungsdatum | 13.09.2021 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Chicago Studies in American Politics |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
| Themenwelt | Geschichte ► Allgemeine Geschichte ► Neuzeit (bis 1918) |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung | |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-226-79783-X / 022679783X |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-226-79783-0 / 9780226797830 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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