Groundless Belief (eBook)

An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition

Michael Williams (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF

2020
208 Seiten
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-22202-8 (ISBN)

Infos

Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "e;phenomenalism,"e; the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "e;phenomenalism,"e; according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical sense-datum and reductionist form but empiricism generally. Williams examines and rejects the idea that, unless our beliefs are answerable to a "e;given"e; element in experience, objective knowledge will be impossible. Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 8.12.2020
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
• Schlagworte: A. J. Ayer • Analytic–synthetic distinction • appearance and reality • Apprehension (understanding) • Argument • Argument from analogy • Armstrong, D. M. • A Treatise of Human Nature • Austin, J. L. • awareness • Axiom • Ayer, A. J. • Basic belief • Begging the Question • Bennett, J. • Berkeley • Blanshard, B. • Bradley, F. H. • Brute fact • Carnap, R. • Certainty • Chisholm, R. • Clarence Irving Lewis • coherentism • Concept • Consciousness • contextualism • Contradiction • Cornman, J. • counterintuitive • credibility • critique • David Hume • Descartes • Dewey, J. • dichotomy • Disenchantment • Disposition • Empirical Evidence • Empiricism • Epistemology • Explanation • explication • fallacy • Falsity • Feeling • F. H. Bradley • Field, H. • Firth, R. • Foundationalism • G. E. Moore • Gettier, E. • Gettier problem • Gilbert Harman • Goodman, N. • Green, T. H. • Grice, H. P. • Hahn, H. • Hans Reichenbach • Harman, G. • H. H. Price • Holism • Hume • hypothesis • idealism • Incorrigibility • ineffability • inference • infinite regress • Inquiry • KANTIANISM • Knowledge • Lewis, C.I. • Locke • Logic • Logical Positivism • Logical truth • Malcolm, N. • Materialism • Mates, B. • Matter of fact • Moore, G.E. • Neurath, O. • nous • object language • Ontology • Paul, G. A. • P. F. Strawson • phenomenalism • phenomenon • Philosopher • Philosophical investigations • Philosophy • Philosophy of mind • Plato • Pollock, J. • Popkin, R. H. • Prediction • premise • Presumption (canon law) • Price, H. H. • Principle • Probability • Process Philosophy • Qualia • Quantity • Quine, W. V. • Quinton, A. • Reality • reason • Reductio ad absurdum • reductionism • Regress argument • Reichenbach, H. • Requirement • Richard Rorty • Rorty, R. • Ross, J. J. • Russell, B. • Schlick, M. • scientific theory • Secundum quid • Self-knowledge (psychology) • Sellars, W. • Shoemaker, S. • skepticism • Suggestion • Symptom • Tarski, A. • Terminology • theory • Theory of Justification • Theory of knowledge (IB course) • The Philosopher • Thompson, J. • Thought • Truth • Uncertainty • Understanding • Unger, P. • Usage • Wilfrid Sellars • Willard Van Orman Quine • Wittgenstein, L. • Writing
• ISBN-10: 0-691-22202-9 / 0691222029
• ISBN-13: 978-0-691-22202-8 / 9780691222028