Feelings of Believing
Psychology, History, Phenomenology
Seiten
2020
Lexington Books (Verlag)
978-1-4985-7717-5 (ISBN)
Lexington Books (Verlag)
978-1-4985-7717-5 (ISBN)
In Feelings of Believing, Ryan Hickerson interprets the doxastic theories of Hume, Descartes, Husserl, and James in light of empirical work on attention and overconfidence. It brings together the history of philosophy, phenomenology, and psychology.
In Feelings of Believing: Psychology, History, Phenomenology, Ryan Hickerson demonstrates that philosophers as diverse as Hume, Descartes, Husserl, and William James all treated believing as feeling. He argues that doxastic sentimentalism, thereby, is considerably more central to modern epistemology than has standardly been recognized. When the empirical psychology of overconfidence and attention is brought to bear on the history of philosophy and the phenomenology of believing, all point toward belief as fundamentally affective. Understanding believing as feeling has the potential to make us better believers, both by encouraging suspicion of unexamined certainties and by focusing attention on credulity. Hickerson argues that believing is typically felt but not given attention by the believer, and he suggests that virtuous believers are those who pay careful attention to their own sentiments-- who attempt to raise their beliefs to the level of judgments.
In Feelings of Believing: Psychology, History, Phenomenology, Ryan Hickerson demonstrates that philosophers as diverse as Hume, Descartes, Husserl, and William James all treated believing as feeling. He argues that doxastic sentimentalism, thereby, is considerably more central to modern epistemology than has standardly been recognized. When the empirical psychology of overconfidence and attention is brought to bear on the history of philosophy and the phenomenology of believing, all point toward belief as fundamentally affective. Understanding believing as feeling has the potential to make us better believers, both by encouraging suspicion of unexamined certainties and by focusing attention on credulity. Hickerson argues that believing is typically felt but not given attention by the believer, and he suggests that virtuous believers are those who pay careful attention to their own sentiments-- who attempt to raise their beliefs to the level of judgments.
Ryan Hickerson, PhD, teaches philosophy at Western Oregon University.
Contents
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction: Recovering Sentimentalism
Chapter One: Feeling Disbelief: Hume’s Doxastic Sentimentalism
Chapter Two: Feeling Certain and The Circle: A Sentimental Interpretation of Cartesian Clarity
Chapter Three: The Psychology of Overconfidence
Chapter Four: The Feeling of Self-Evidence: Husserlian Evidenz as Gefühlsindex
Appendix to Chapter Four: Straw Men in Dark Times
Chapter Five: Doxasticity as Electricity: William James and the Live Hypothesis
Chapter Six: Attention and Feeling Noticed: Phenomenology and Psychology
Conclusion: Beliefy Feelings, Whence and Whither
Bibliography
Erscheinungsdatum | 10.05.2021 |
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Verlagsort | Lanham, MD |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 160 x 229 mm |
Gewicht | 671 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Philosophie der Neuzeit |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie | |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie | |
ISBN-10 | 1-4985-7717-2 / 1498577172 |
ISBN-13 | 978-1-4985-7717-5 / 9781498577175 |
Zustand | Neuware |
Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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