Direct Reference
Blackwell Publishers (Verlag)
978-0-631-18154-5 (ISBN)
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In this book Professor Recanati sets out to defend and systematize the much-discussed "theory of direct reference", according to which the contribution made by a referential term, (for example, a proper name or a demonstrative) to the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is its reference. To deal with the objections traditionally levelled against that theory, he puts forward a general account of "de re" thoughts and communication which blends insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions. In the second part of the book, recent advances in pragmatics are presented and used to shed light on the referential/attributive distinction (with respect to both definite descriptions and indexicals) and belief reports. New treatments of some of the major topics in the philosophy of mind and language are offered along the way.
Part 1 Direct reference in language and thought: "de re" communication - direct reference and linguistic meaning - rigidity "de jure", singular propositions and thoughts, the communication of "de re" thoughts; from language to thought - linguistic and psychological modes of presentation, indexicals in thought; "de re" thoughts - "de re" modes of presentation, egocentric concepts vs encyclopedia entries; proper names - the meaning of proper names, answering Kripke's objections, proper names in thought; the two-component pictures, a defence - narrow content and psychological explanation, externalism and the two-component picture. Part 2 The pragmatics of direct reference: methodological preliminaries - truth-conditional pragmatics, primary pragmatic processes. Appendix Availability and the scope principle: referential/attributive - the referential use of definite descriptions, the descriptive use of indexicals; belief reports - belief reports and conversational implicatures, belief reports and the semantics of "that" clauses, comparison with other accounts, how ambiguous are belief sentences?
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 4.3.1993 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | references |
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
| Gewicht | 723 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft ► Sprachwissenschaft | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-631-18154-7 / 0631181547 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-631-18154-5 / 9780631181545 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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