Resemblance Nominalism
A Solution to the Problem of Universals
Seiten
2002
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-924377-8 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-924377-8 (ISBN)
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigour.
Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the dormant alternative theory of resemblance nominalism, showing first that it can withstand the attacks of such eminent opponents as Goodman and Armstrong, and then that there are reasons to prefer it to its rival theories. The clarity and rigour of his arguments will challenge metaphysicians to rethink their views on properties.
Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the dormant alternative theory of resemblance nominalism, showing first that it can withstand the attacks of such eminent opponents as Goodman and Armstrong, and then that there are reasons to prefer it to its rival theories. The clarity and rigour of his arguments will challenge metaphysicians to rethink their views on properties.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra is Fellow and Tutor of Philosophy at Hertford College, Oxford.
Introduction ; 1. The Problem of Universals: A Problem about Truthmakers ; 2. The Explananda of the Problems of Universals ; 3. The Many over One ; 4. Resemblance Nominalism ; 5. The Coextension Difficulty ; 6. Russell's Regress ; 7. The Resemblance Structure of Property Classes ; 8. Goodman's Difficulties ; 9. The Imperfect Community Difficulty ; 10. The Companionship Difficulty ; 11. The Mere Intersections Difficulty ; 12. The Superiority of Resemblance Nominalism ; Appendix: On Imperfect Communities and the Non-communities they Entail ; References, Index
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 1.8.2002 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | 5 figures |
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 144 x 225 mm |
| Gewicht | 448 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-924377-8 / 0199243778 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-924377-8 / 9780199243778 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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