Motivational Internalism
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-936795-5 (ISBN)
Motivational internalism-the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation-is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as problems for non-cognitivists.
This volume's thirteen new essays and introduction are meant to help readers appreciate state-of-the-art of research on internalism, to identify connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen discussion of a number of central aspects of metaethics. The introductory chapter provides a structured overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades, while the book's three main sections focus on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism, the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues, and different ways of accommodating both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice, respectively.
Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund have published widely on issues related to the volume published. Their papers have appeared in journals such as Mind, Ethics, Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Journal of Ethics, and Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Preface ; Contributors ; 1 Motivational internalism: Contemporary debates ; Gunnar Bjornsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francen Olinder, John Eriksson, Fredrik Bjorklund ; I. Evidence ; Introduction to Part I: Evidence for and against motivational internalism ; 2 Evaluative judgements, judgments about reasons, and motivations ; Michael Smith ; 3 Motivational externalism: Formulation, methodology, rationality and indifference ; Nick Zangwill ; 4 An empirical case for motivational internalism ; Jesse Prinz ; 5 Unconditional motivational internalism and Hume's lesson ; Daniel Eggers ; 6 What's required for motivation by principle? ; Jeanette Kennett ; II. Relevance ; Introduction to Part II: The relevance of motivational internalism ; 7 Internalism: Cui bono? ; Michael Ridge ; 8 Pure expressivism and motivational internalism ; Teemu Toppinen ; 9 Can reasons fundamentalism answer the normative question? ; James Dreier ; 10 Naturalistic Moral Realism and Motivational Internalism, From Negative to Positive ; Jon Tresan ; III. Bridging the gap ; Introduction to part III: Bridging the gap between internalism and externalism ; 11 Detecting value with motivational responses ; Sigrun Svavarsdottir ; 12 Intuition and belief in moral motivation ; Antti Kauppinen ; 13 Tempered internalism and the participatory stance ; Kate Manne ; 14 Two functions of moral language: Rethinking the amoralist ; John Thomas Mumm ; Index
| Reihe/Serie | Oxford Moral Theory |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | 1 illustration |
| Verlagsort | New York |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 236 x 157 mm |
| Gewicht | 544 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie | |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-936795-7 / 0199367957 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-936795-5 / 9780199367955 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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