Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (eBook)
400 Seiten
Wiley (Verlag)
978-1-118-32812-5 (ISBN)
Matthias Steup is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA, where he is head of the Department of Philosophy. A specialist in epistemology, he is a widely published author and editor. Previous work includes A Companion to Epistemology (co-edited with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, second edition), the first edition of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (co-edited with Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), and Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001). John Turri is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. A specialist in epistemology and the philosophy of language, he has published dozens of articles on these topics in leading journals such as Philosophical Review, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Analysis, and Philosophical Studies. He currently holds an Early Researcher Award from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation. Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, USA. He has published books and articles in epistemology, including Knowledge in Perspective (1991), Epistemic Justification (with Laurence BonJour, Blackwell, 2003), A Virtue Epistemology (2007), Reflective Knowledge (2009), and Knowing Full Well (2011).
Notes on Contributors viii
Preface to the Second Edition xiii
Preface to the First Edition xiv
1 Should Knowledge Come First? 1
Knowledge First Timothy Williamson 1
What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? Trent Dougherty and
Patrick Rysiew 10
Experience First Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 17
Knowledge Still First Timothy Williamson 22
Still Nowhere Else to Start Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew
25
2 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? 27
The Case against Closure Fred Dretske 27
The Case for Closure John Hawthorne 40
Reply to Hawthorne Fred Dretske 56
3 Is Knowledge Contextual? 60
Contextualism Contested Earl Conee 60
Contextualism Defended Stewart Cohen 69
Contextualism Contested Some More Earl Conee 75
Contextualism Defended Some More Stewart Cohen 79
4 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know? 84
Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know Jeremy Fantl and
Matthew McGrath 84
Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know Baron Reed
95
5 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? 107
The Refutation of Skepticism Jonathan Vogel 108
The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism Richard Fumerton 120
6 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge?
133
Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated Jason Baehr 133
Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 140
Reply to Zagzebski Jason Baehr 146
Reply to Baehr Linda Zagzebski 149
7 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? 152
Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky Duncan Pritchard 152
Knowledge Can Be Lucky Stephen Hetherington 164
8 Is There a Priori Knowledge? 177
In Defense of the a Priori Laurence BonJour 177
There Is No a Priori Michael Devitt 185
Reply to Devitt Laurence BonJour 195
Reply to BonJour Michael Devitt 197
Last Rejoinder Laurence BonJour 200
9 Is There Immediate Justification? 202
There Is Immediate Justification James Pryor 202
There Is no Immediate Justification Juan Comesaña 222
Reply to Comesaña James Pryor 235
Reply to Pryor Juan Comesaña 239
10 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone?
244
Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and
Tenability Catherine Z. Elgin 244
Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate
Foundationalism James Van Cleve 255
Reply to Van Cleve Catherine Z. Elgin 267
Reply to Elgin James Van Cleve 271
11 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem?
274
Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem Peter Klein
274
Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem Carl Ginet
283
Reply to Ginet Peter Klein 291
Reply to Klein Carl Ginet 295
12 Can Evidence Be Permissive? 298
Evidence Can Be Permissive Thomas Kelly 298
Evidence Cannot Be Permissive Roger White 312
13 Is Justification Internal? 324
Justification Is Not Internal John Greco 325
Justification Is Internal Richard Feldman 337
14 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? 351
Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal Jonathan L. Kvanvig
352
Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis Marian
David 363
Index 378
"When Blackwell published the first edition of
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology in 2005, that volume
very quickly became epistemology's superego: it expressed the
ideals that were implicit in the best recent epistemological work,
and it served to guide both practicing and apprenticing
epistemologists to the questions that mattered most to the field
back then. Of course, the questions that matter most in 2013 are
not exactly the same as those that mattered most in 2005; thus, the
need for a new edition. I expect that this new edition --
which contains units on the now widely discussed issues of whether
knowledge is epistemologically fundamental, whether practical
concerns encroach on epistemic status, whether evidential
justification is permissive, what sort of epistemic luck (if any)
is incompatible with knowledge -- will serve to guide
epistemological practice for the next several years, and with at
least as much authority as the first edition. The contributors are
among the most prominent in the field, and their contributions
represent some of the best work being done on the topics under
discussion. If you want to contribute to the most important
epistemological conversations today, you will need to read this
book."
--Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Praise for the First Edition
"This book is packed with cutting-edge epistemology by
excellent contributors to the field. It is both comprehensive and
admirably brief."
-- Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame
"What are the burning problems of today's
epistemology? What are the most promising solutions to these
problems? They are all in this timely volume, explained and debated
by leading authorities."
--Alvin Goldman, Rutgers University
"With leading and emerging figures in epistemology
debating some of its most fundamental questions, this volume will
be required reading for anyone interested in where the theory of
knowledge has been and where it is going. A superb
collection."
--Paul Boghossian, New York University
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 22.7.2013 |
---|---|
Reihe/Serie | Contemporary Debates in Philosophy | Contemporary Debates in Philosophy |
Sprache | englisch |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie | |
Schlagworte | Epistemology • Erkenntnistheorie • Philosophie • Philosophy |
ISBN-10 | 1-118-32812-4 / 1118328124 |
ISBN-13 | 978-1-118-32812-5 / 9781118328125 |
Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
Haben Sie eine Frage zum Produkt? |
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