Decomposing the Will

Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, Tillmann Vierkant (Herausgeber)

Buch | Hardcover

368 Seiten

2013
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-974699-6 (ISBN)

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There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be radically mistaken. The science, some argue, recommends a view of conscious agency as merely epiphenomenal: an impotent accompaniment to the whirring unconscious machinery (the inner zombie) that prepares, decides and causes our behavior. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim, revisiting the folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive, and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.

Part 1 of this volume provides an overview of the scientific research that has been taken to support "the zombie challenge." In part 2, contributors explore the phenomenology of agency and what it is like to be the author of one's own actions. Part 3 then explores different strategies for using the science and phenomenology of human agency to respond to the zombie challenge.

Questions explored include: what distinguishes automatic behavior and voluntary action? What, if anything, does consciousness contribute to the voluntary control of behavior? What does the science of human behavior really tell us about the nature of self-control?

Andy Clark is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Julian Kiverstein is Postdoctoral Researcher in Philosophy at University of the Edinburgh. Tillmann Vierkant is Lecturer of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.

Chapter 1 ; Introduction ; Tillmann Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein, and Andy Clark ; Part I: The Zombie Challenge ; Chapter 2 ; The Neuroscience of Volition ; Adina L. Roskies ; Chapter 3 ; Beyond Libet: Long-term Prediction of Free Choices from Neuroimaging Signals ; John-Dylan Haynes ; Chapter 4 ; Vetoing and Consciousness ; Alfred R. Mele ; Chapter 5 ; Determinism & Predictability ; Richard Holton ; Part II: The Sense of Agency ; Chapter 6 ; From the Fact to the Sense of Agency ; Manos Tsakiris and Aikaterini Fotopoulou ; Chapter 7 ; Ambiguity in the Sense of Agency ; Shaun Gallagher ; Chapter 8 ; There's Nothing Life Being Free: Default Dispositions, Judgments of Freedom, and the Phenomenology of Coercion ; Fabio Paglieri ; Chapter 9 ; Agency as a Marker of Consciousness ; Tim Bayne ; Part III: The Function of Conscious Control: Conflict Resolution, Emotion, and Mental Actions ; Chapter 10 ; Voluntary Action and the Three Forms of Binding in the Brain ; Ezequiel Morsella, Tara C. Dennehy, and John A. Bargh ; Chapter 11 ; Emotion Regulation and Free Will ; Nico H. Frijda ; Chapter 12 ; Action Control by Implementation Intentions: The Role of Discrete Emotions ; Sam J. Maglio, Peter M. Gollwitzer, and Gabriele Oettingen ; Chapter 13 ; Mental Action and the Threat of Automaticity ; Wayne Wu ; Chapter 14 ; Mental Acts as Natural Kinds ; Joelle Proust ; Part IV: Decomposed Accounts of the Will ; Chapter 15 ; Managerial control and free mental agency ; Tillmann Vierkant ; Chapter 16 ; Recomposing the Will: Distributed Motivation and Computer Mediated Extrospection ; Lars Hall and Petter Johansson ; Chapter 17 ; Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments ; Manuel Vargas

Erscheint lt. Verlag	2.4.2013
Reihe/Serie	Philosophy of Mind Series
Verlagsort	New York
Sprache	englisch
Maße	239 x 163 mm
Gewicht	607 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Philosophie des Mittelalters
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie
ISBN-10	0-19-974699-0 / 0199746990
ISBN-13	978-0-19-974699-6 / 9780199746996
Zustand	Neuware