Self in Infancy (eBook)

Theory and Research

P. Rochat (Herausgeber)

eBook Download: PDF

1995 | 1. Auflage
480 Seiten
Elsevier Science (Verlag)
978-0-08-054263-8 (ISBN)

Infos

The origins of knowledge about the self is arguably the most fundamental problem of psychology. It is a classic theme that has preoccupied great psychologists, beginning with William James and Freud. On reading current literature, today's developmental psychologists and ethologists are clearly expressing a renewed interest in the topic. Furthermore, recent progress in the study of infant and animal behavior, provides important and genuinely new insights regarding the origins of self-knowledge.

This book is a collection of current theoretical views and research on the self in early infancy, prior to self-identification and the well-documented emergence of mirror self-recognition. The focus is on the early sense of self of the young infant. Its aim is to provide an account of recent research substantiating the precursors of self-recognition and self-identification. By concentrating on early infancy, the book provides an updated look at the origins of self-knowledge.

Inhalt

Front Cover 1
THE SELF IN INFANCY 4
Copyright Page 5
CONTENTS 8
Preface 6
List of Contributors 12
PART I: Theory 16
Chapter 1. Are we automata? 18
Chapter 2. Criteria for an ecological self 32
Chapter 3. The self as an object of consciousness in infancy 50
Chapter 4. Early objectification of the self 68
Chapter 5. A theory of the role of imitation in the emergence of self 88
Chapter 6. Aspects of self: From systems to ideas 110
Chapter 7. Relational narratives of the prelinguistic self 132
Chapter 8. From direct to reflexive (self-) knowledge: A recursive model (self-produced) actions considered as transformations 156
Chapter 9. The unduplicated self 176
Chapter 10. The self as reference point: Can animals do without it? 208
PART II: Research 232
Section 1. The Self Revealed in Posture and Action 234
Chapter 11. Self-knowledge of body position: Integration of perceptual and action system information 236
Chapter 12. Using a computerized testing system to investigate the preconceptual self in nonhuman primates and humans 258
Chapter 13. Move yourself, baby! Perceptuo-motor development from a continuous perspective 272
Chapter 14. Interactions between the vestibular and visual systems in the neonate 292
Chapter 15. Two modes of perceiving the self 318
Section 2. Perceptual Origins of the Self 340
Chapter 16. The effect of blindness on the early development of the self 342
Chapter 17. Intermodal origins of self-perception 364
Chapter 18. Self-orientation in early infancy: The general role of contingency and the specific case of reaching to the mouth 390
Chapter 19. The function and determinants of early self-exploration 410
Section 3. Social Origins of the Self 432
Chapter 20. Self/other differentiation in the domain of intimate socio-affective interaction: Some considerations 434
Chapter 21. Becoming a self 446
Chapter 22. Understanding the self as social agent 464
Author Index 476
Subject Index 490

Textauszug

Chapter 1

Are We Automata?

Eleanor J. Gibson    Cornell University

Issues in psychology seem always to be approachable from two perspectives: the structural view and the functional view. The issue of a “self” is no exception. It began its research life from a structuralist approach, as so much of classical experimental psychology did. But American functionalism offered a possible alternative way of addressing the question, and the two views have been clothed by their advocates and played against each other, enjoying swings of popularity. I think we are just now at a moment of confrontation, and I intend to take a stand. Having borrowed my title from William James (1879), it will of course be a functional stand, but I will not borrow his arguments, which were mainly philosophical. Better ones, in my (I hope) scientific way of thinking are now available. How should we think about a self, a person? As a concept based on a body image, a representation of oneself to oneself, with a face that can be presented to others? Or shall we think of ourselves in quite another way, as agents in control of our actions, in functional terms? I consider these two views, how they have unfolded in theory and research in the past half century, and then argue for my view.

The first paper I remember reading on the subject of self-awareness in an infant was one published in 1948 in Enfance, entitled “Images du Corps et Conscience de Soi,” by R. Zazzo. He observed his own child’s responses to a mirror placed before him and to pictures of himself, through the child’s first 3 years, and concluded: “By the way the child reacts to the image of his body, the mirror therefore reveals the origins of consciousness, the image of the body being essentially the consciousness of the self” (p. 43). He found self-recognition in the mirror at about one year, 7 months, and self-recognition of a photograph later, at 2 years, 9 months. When shown his photograph then, the child announced, “C’est moi.” Predictably, with the advent of the cognitive revolution, research on self-recognition grew, the favorite method continued to employ the mirror, and a test was evolved. A spot of rouge or paint was daubed on a child’s nose, and a surprise reaction at the mirror reflection was awaited. (Amsterdam, 1972; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Arguments have centered frequently on how early this reaction happened; most researchers suggest some time between 18 and 22 months.

Observations of animals provided with mirrors reflecting themselves were not infrequent even before observations on human infants (Gallup, 1968). Most of the species observed responded socially, as if to another animal. But Gallup (1970) found that chimpanzees, after a few days provision with a mirror, spent a considerable amount of time in self-directed behavior (making faces, picking food from their teeth, etc.). After giving them access to a mirror for ten days, Gallup anesthetized the chimps and painted marks on their faces with a red dye. When they recovered from anesthesia, the chimps were again observed before the mirror. They apparently recognized their own facial features because they made many attempts to touch the marked area (unlike unmarked chimps). Similar procedures have been tried with other primates, but except for orangutans, no others seem to qualify for recognizing their own mirror images. Speaking of the failure of monkeys on this test, Gallup remarked, “Without an identity of your own it would be impossible to recognize yourself. And therein may lie the basic difference between monkeys and great apes. The monkey’s inability to recognize himself may be due to the absence of a sufficiently well-integrated self-concept” (Gallup, 1977, p. 329).

The linkage of mirror recognition and presence of a self-concept seems to be taken for granted. It is referred to again and again in a currently popular debate about whether animals have a “theory of mind.” Are animals aware of what they do? Does self-recognition imply a “self-concept” and even “mental state attribution”? (See letters in the American Psychologist, August, 1994; Westergaard & Hopkins; Mitchell, Westergaard, Parker, & Boccia). There are those who want to feel that humans are special, as Descartes argued. But it seems that one can grudgingly admit a few of the great apes by this test, admitting that they may have a self-concept and even intentions, but still keep out the animal hoi-polloi. Animals were seldom thought to have egos, even in the golden days of rat psychology (or maybe especially not then). Even the generous Tolman did not ascribe an ego to a rat, although he used the term ego.

Body image theories of the self have had many defenders, such as psychoanalysts and psychiatrists. Missionaries, on the other hand, reported that “primitive men” did not recognize themselves in mirrors or in pictures. Stone Age man did not represent himself in pictures, although he gloriously represented deer, bison, and other animals on his cave walls. Is recognizing one’s image not only the epitome of self-awareness, but also the crowning achievement of evolution and civilization? I have one anecdote that belies it. I once read the story of an elderly lady strolling down a boulevard and passing before a shop window. “Who is that old woman staring at me?” she asked herself. But as she took a step, touched the ground with her cane and lifted it, she realized that it was her own reflection in the glass of the window. “But that isn’t me,” she thought. The superficial structures change, the wrinkles come, and the white hair. But the way we change ourselves, when we do, is in our intentions, our expectations, the choices we make, and the actions we perform. The core of our “selves” is not a representation of any kind, but the knowledge we have gained as participants in the world, the alternative ways to act that we have learned, and the way we select our actions and our hopes.

I reject a static, representational concept of a self. I don’t accept a structuralist definition because we need a functional theory with dynamics and the power of control incorporated in it. I have another anecdote to introduce this view. One First Day, at a Friend’s Meeting that I sometimes attend, the silence was broken by a Friend who had apparently been impressed (and depressed) by recent findings and theories of astrophysicists about the universe. She said, “When I think about the immense cosmic forces and the awesome, endless stretch of space, I feel how infinitesimal, weak, and powerless we humans are.” But I found myself thinking that this was an incorrect inference to draw, that it neglected an essential fact. Living creatures have the power to control their movements and actions, and no planet or meteor or force of the physical universe does. As humans we have self-control, or agency, a far more remarkable kind of power than blind force. This is my candidate for how to think about a self — not a structure, or image of a body or a face, but control of one’s actions and interactions with the world and with others. This kind of self does not have to wait, either, until 18 months, or whenever facial features are recognized. Differentiation of distinctive features of objects, even such objects as faces, does not occur very early in perceptual development, but intentional activity does.

I believe that knowledge of oneself begins with perception. Furthermore, as one who embraces an ecological approach to perception, I do not believe that perception begins with an image — either retinal, mirror, photographic, or any other kind. Perception is an activity, the obtaining of information from a dynamic array in the environment surrounding the perceiver. This activity begins immediately at birth (and to some extent before). The obtainable information specifies events in both the surrounding environment and in the perceiver.

It also specifies the relations between them, such as the fitness of the perceiver’s action systems for using the affordances presented by the environment and the environmental consequences of any action that is performed or attempted. As actions are performed, information is generated about what the perceiver is doing and what he or she can expect to do — in other words, about the self. There it is, in a nutshell — by your own actions shall you know yourself. Fortunately, we can now be more explicit about this statement because there is research available on how a self is specified in action and thus can be perceived.

A functional view of how a self is specified for infant perceivers can call upon evidence from several lines of research (E. Gibson, 1994). How do we know that an infant perceives information that specifies a self? To begin with, a self is differentiated from the external world of objects and events by detecting the difference between two kinds of events. There are movements of things in the world around me, and there are movements perpetrated by me, as an actor. I can perceive the difference between motion I have caused and motions caused by things or by someone else. There are at least two kinds of information available to the perceptual systems for detecting this difference; one is a kind of flow in the visual field that is caused by any movement of my head or body as I look around my surroundings. These flow patterns constitute visual feedback that is specific to my...

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 30.10.1995
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Entwicklungspsychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Pädagogische Psychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Psychoanalyse / Tiefenpsychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Sozialpsychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Test in der Psychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie
• ISBN-10: 0-08-054263-8 / 0080542638
• ISBN-13: 978-0-08-054263-8 / 9780080542638