Singular Reference: A Descriptivist Perspective (eBook)

Francesco Orilia (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF

2009 | 2010
XIV, 290 Seiten
Springer Netherland (Verlag)
978-90-481-3312-3 (ISBN)

Infos

Singular reference is the relation that a singular term has to a corresponding individual. For example, 'Obama' singularly refer to the current US president. Descriptivism holds that all singular terms refer by means of a concept associated to the term. The current trend is against this. This book explains in detail (mainly for newcomers) why anti-descriptivism became dominant in spite of its weaknesses and (for experts) how these weaknesses can be overcome by appropriately reviving descriptivism.

Francesco Orilia studied philosophy at the university of Palermo (M.A., 1979) and then, after being granted a Fulbright grant, at Indiana University, Bloomington (Ph.D., 1986), where he was a student of Hector-Neri Castañeda, Nino B. Cocchiarella and J. M. Dunn. From 1987 to 1994 he was a researcher in artificial intelligence at the Olivetti research lab in Pisa and from July 1994 to July 1997 a researcher/lecturer in theoretical philosophy at the University of Cagliari. Since August 1997 he has been with the university of Macerata where he is currently professor of philosophy of language. He also had visiting positions at Indiana University, Bloomington (1986), University of Paris IV (2005), University of Iowa at Iowa City (2006), Cambridge University (2008). In the period 2000-2003 he was a member of the selection committee of the E. W. Beth Dissertation Prize for logic, language, and information and he is now in the editorial board of Metaphysica. He has written or co-edited a few books and published many papers in international journals such as Dialectica, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Minds and Machines, Synthese, Topoi.

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Singular reference to ourselves and the ordinary objects surrounding us is a most crucial philosophical topic, for it looms large in any attempt to understand how language and mind connect to the world. This book explains in detail why in the past philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Reichenbach have favoured a descriptivist approach to this matter and why in more recent times Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan and others have rather favoured a referentialist standpoint. The now dominant referentialist theories however still have a hard time in addressing propositional attitudes and empty singular terms. Here a way out of this difficulty emerges in an approach that incorporates aspects of the old-fashioned descriptivist views of Frege, Russell and Reichenbach without succumbing to the anti-descriptivist arguments that back up the current referentialist trend. The resulting theory features a novel approach to the semantics and pragmatics of determiner phrases, definite descriptions, propernames and indexicals, all treated in uniform fashion in both their anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses.This work will be of interest to researchers in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and theoretical linguistics. The wealth of background information and detailed explanations that it provides makes it also accessible to graduate and upper level undergraduates and suitable as a reference book.

Inhalt

Preface 6
Contents 10
1 Introduction: Referentialism vs. Descriptivism 13
1.1 The Topic 13
1.2 Plan of the Book 18
1.3 Some Conventions 20
1.4 Referentialism 24
1.5 Descriptivism 27
1.6 Propositions, Singular and Otherwise 29
1.7 Active and Non-active Denoting Concepts 31
1.8 Contents and Meanings 38
1.9 Tense 41
1.10 Linguistic vs. Pragmatic Meaning 45
1.11 Subjective vs. Official Meaning 48
2 Background Notions 50
2.1 Linguistic and Pragmatic Meaning Further Characterized 50
2.2 Contextualized Linguistic Meaning vs. Pragmatic Meaning 52
2.3 Conversational Implicatures and Implicitures Conversational impliciture 55
2.4 Genuine vs. Non-genuine Determiner Phrases 61
2.5 Singular Terms Used as Singular Terms 64
2.6 Anaphoras 69
2.7 The Contextualized Linguistic Meaning of Anaphoric Determiner Phrases 74
2.8 Quasi-Indicators 81
2.9 Reference 82
2.10 Contextual Parameters 84
3 Why Descriptivism Was So Successful 90
3.1 Premise 90
3.2 The Co-reference Problem I 90
3.3 The Co-reference Problem II 93
3.4 Coherent and Incoherent Assent 100
3.5 The No-reference Problem and Negative existential 102
3.6 Cognitive Significance 106
3.7 The Classical Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names 107
3.8 Frege, G., Russell B. and Reichenbach, H.on Indexicals 109
3.9 Linguistic Descriptivism 113
4 Why Referentialism Is So Successful 118
4.1 Premise 118
4.2 The Indispensability of Indexicals 118
4.3 The Wide Scope/Narrow Scope Objection 122
4.4 The Modal, Epistemic and Semantic Arguments 125
4.5 The Modal Argument About Indexicals 126
4.6 Necessary A Posteriori and Contingent Contingent A Priori Statements 128
4.7 Kaplan, D.s Semantics for Indexicals 131
4.8 Self-Supporting and Self-Defeating Sentences 135
4.9 Kaplans Twin Argument Against Freges Theory of Indexicals 139
4.10 Misdescription and Pronominal Contradiction 141
4.11 The Problems of Choice, Ignorance and Error 143
4.12 Kripke, S. Pierre and Paderewski, I. J.Puzzles 145
5 Definite Descriptions and Proper Names 148
5.1 Premise 148
5.2 The Relation PRAG 149
5.3 The Pragmatic Meaning of Basic Determiner Phrases 152
5.4 The Relation 153
5.5 Genuine Singular Terms 155
5.6 Definite Descriptions 157
5.7 Proper Names in General 161
5.8 Nominal Properties 163
5.9 Causal Descriptivism 167
5.10 Objections to the Causal Theory of Names 169
5.11 The Pragmatic Meaning of Anaphoric Determiner Phrases and Singular Terms 173
6 Indexicals 179
6.1 Indexicals in General 179
6.2 Indexical Properties Indexical 181
6.3 The First-Person and Second-Person Pronouns 184
6.4 Saliency and the Interdoxastic Domain 187
6.5 Demonstrative Indexicals 190
6.6 The Locative Pronouns 194
6.7 Anaphoric Anaphora Indexicals 197
7 Tense, Temporal Indexicals and Other Miscellaneous Issues 202
7.1 The Eternalism Version of CD 202
7.2 The Temporalist Version of CD 205
7.3 The Temporal Pronouns 208
7.4 The Relation on, temporal relation 211
7.5 Quasi-indicators and the De Dicto/De Re Distinction 213
7.6 Knowing Who the Referent Is 217
7.7 Phenomenal Entities and Thinking Individuation 220
7.8 Self-Consciousness Self-consciousness and Self-knowledge 226
7.9 Extra-Meanings 230
7.10 Metonymical and Metaphorical Uses of Indexicals Metaphor Metonymy 234
8 Conclusion: Accounting for the Referentialist Data 240
8.1 Premise 240
8.2 The Indispensability of Indexicals Revisited 240
8.3 Indexicals with Narrow Scope Narrow 241
8.4 An Attempt to Reapply the Modal, Epistemic and Semantic Arguments 246
8.5 The Modal Arguments About Indexicals Reconsidered 250
8.6 Another Look at Necessary a posteriori and Contingent a Propositions 251
8.7 Logical Truth, Validity and Indexicals 252
8.8 An Account of Self-Supporting Sentences 258
8.9 Kaplan, D.Twins and the Need for Impure Descriptive Contents 259
8.10 Misdescription, Pronominal contradiction and Collateral Propositions 261
8.11 Taming the Problems of Choice, Ignorance and Error 264
8.12 A Solution for the Pierre and Paderewski, I. J. Puzzles 266
8.13 Referentialism and the Co-reference and No-reference Problems 268
8.14 Concluding Remarks 277
Appendix 278
Bibliography 280
Analytical Index 291

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 1.12.2009
• Reihe/Serie: Philosophical Studies Series
• Reihe/Serie: Philosophical Studies Series
• Zusatzinfo: XIV, 290 p.
• Verlagsort: Dordrecht
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft ► Sprachwissenschaft
• Schlagworte: Bertrand Russell • Contextual Descriptivism • Definite descriptions • Descriptivism • Gottlob Frege • Indexicals • language • Meaning • Philosophy of Language • Proper names • Propositional attitudes • Reference • Referentialism • Singular reference
• ISBN-10: 90-481-3312-2 / 9048133122
• ISBN-13: 978-90-481-3312-3 / 9789048133123