Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium
Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games
Seiten
2000
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-64330-6 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-64330-6 (ISBN)
Reporting on a fifteen year research program, Professor Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide foundations for theory of general competitive equilibrium. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.
The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.
The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.
1. Markets and games; 2. Perfect competition; 3. Continuity and anonymity; 4. Bounded rationality; 5. Afterthoughts.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 28.8.2000 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Churchill Lectures in Economics |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 140 x 216 mm |
| Gewicht | 450 g |
| Themenwelt | Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Ökonometrie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-521-64330-9 / 0521643309 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-64330-6 / 9780521643306 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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