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Economic Signals - Masaoki Tamura

Economic Signals (eBook)

Prize Promotions, Anonymous Giving, and Political Advertisements

(Autor)

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2018 | 1st ed. 2018
IX, 50 Seiten
Springer Singapore (Verlag)
978-981-10-8938-1 (ISBN)
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This Brief sheds new light on three specific aspects of economic behavior - companies offering prize promotions, individuals making anonymous donations, and politicians creating political advertisements. These are considered signals that firms send to consumers, donors send to others, and politicians send to voters, respectively. The author shows why firms, donors, and politicians employ these behaviors, and what their social consequences are from an economic theory perspective.

This book is intended for readers who are interested in industrial organization, the economics of giving, and political economics. Each topic can be seen as an application of simple economic theory to an unusual subject matter in economics. Thus, for students, this work also offers an introduction to analytical methods in time-inconsistency and involving asymmetric information. The problems and economic settings behind these topics are firms' time-inconsistency in a monopoly, asymmetric information in individual altruism, and asymmetric information regarding types of politicians.



Masaoki Tamura is an assistant professor at Nagoya University of Commerce and Business and visiting scholar of the Research Institute of Capital Formation, Development Bank of Japan. Born in 1982, he received a Bachelor's degree in economics at Kyoto University in 2005 and a Ph.D. in economics at the University of Tokyo in 2014. He worked for Hitotsubashi University and Kyoto University before joining Nagoya University of Commerce and Business.


This Brief sheds new light on three specific aspects of economic behavior - companies offering prize promotions, individuals making anonymous donations, and politicians creating political advertisements. These are considered signals that firms send to consumers, donors send to others, and politicians send to voters, respectively. The author shows why firms, donors, and politicians employ these behaviors, and what their social consequences are from an economic theory perspective. This book is intended for readers who are interested in industrial organization, the economics of giving, and political economics. Each topic can be seen as an application of simple economic theory to an unusual subject matter in economics. Thus, for students, this work also offers an introduction to analytical methods in time-inconsistency and involving asymmetric information. The problems and economic settings behind these topics are firms' time-inconsistency in a monopoly, asymmetric information in individual altruism, and asymmetric information regarding types of politicians.

Masaoki Tamura is an assistant professor at Nagoya University of Commerce and Business and visiting scholar of the Research Institute of Capital Formation, Development Bank of Japan. Born in 1982, he received a Bachelor’s degree in economics at Kyoto University in 2005 and a Ph.D. in economics at the University of Tokyo in 2014. He worked for Hitotsubashi University and Kyoto University before joining Nagoya University of Commerce and Business.

1 Tools Used in this Book.- 2 Prize Promotions for Solving Firms’ Time Inconsistency.- 3 Giving and Anonymous Giving for Signaling.- 4 A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements.

Erscheint lt. Verlag 30.3.2018
Reihe/Serie Development Bank of Japan Research Series
Development Bank of Japan Research Series
SpringerBriefs in Economics
SpringerBriefs in Economics
Zusatzinfo IX, 50 p. 1 illus.
Verlagsort Singapore
Sprache englisch
Themenwelt Wirtschaft Volkswirtschaftslehre Mikroökonomie
Schlagworte Advertisement • Anonymous Giving • Industrial Organization • Microeconomics • Prize Promotion • Signaling
ISBN-10 981-10-8938-8 / 9811089388
ISBN-13 978-981-10-8938-1 / 9789811089381
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