Psychoneural Reduction

The New Wave

John Bickle (Autor)

Buch | Hardcover

252 Seiten

1998
MIT Press (Verlag)
978-0-262-02432-7 (ISBN)

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In relation to the interaction between mentality and physicality, this work presents a new type of reductionism, one that is arguably stronger than one-way dependency, yet sidesteps the arguments that call into question classical reductionism.

One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioural and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical. In this work, John Bickle presents a new type of reductionism, one that is arguably stronger than one-way dependency yet sidesteps the arguments that call into question classical reductionism. Although he makes some concessions to classical antireductionism, he argues for a relationship between psychology and neurobiology that shares some of the key aims, features, and consequences of classical reductionism.

Part 1 Why reduction? and why a new-wave version? reductionism revived as a program; a puzzle about nonreductive physicalism. Part 2 Exploiting Hooker's insights: Clifford Hooker's general theory of reduction; applying Hooker's theory - the reduction of the simple thermodynamics of gases to kinetic theory and statistical mechanics; the intertheoretic-reduction reformulation of the mind-body problem; the place for everything argument. Part 3 a theory of intertheoretic reduction: the structuralist model of theories; the reduction relation rho; the "too weak to be adequate" challenge; blurs on rho -significantly corrective reductions; the intertheoretic-reduction spectrum and the distinction between genuine albeit bumpy reductions and mere historical theory successions. Part 4 The irrelevance of arguments against classical reduction: antireductionist arguments based on Davidson's principle of Anomalousness of the Mental; Fodor's conceptual argument from multiple realizability; the obvious objection to the "across individuals at times" counter; three methodological caveats and the mistakes they rest upon; from multiple realizability to a final methodological caveat and the introduction of Token-Token reduction to address it. Part 5 The "put up or shut up" challenge: associative learning - it's not what you thing it is; lessons for antireductionists; is the foundational model of theories and theory reductions applicable to the cognitive and brain sciences? Part 6 Revisionary physicalism: the core properties of propositional attitudes; revisionary physicalism.

Erscheint lt. Verlag	29.5.1998
Reihe/Serie	Bradford Books
Zusatzinfo	14
Verlagsort	Cambridge, Mass.
Sprache	englisch
Maße	152 x 229 mm
Gewicht	544 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie
	Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie
	Naturwissenschaften ► Biologie ► Zoologie
ISBN-10	0-262-02432-2 / 0262024322
ISBN-13	978-0-262-02432-7 / 9780262024327
Zustand	Neuware