Confusion

A Study in the Theory of Knowledge

Joseph L. Camp Jr. (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

256 Seiten

2004
Harvard University Press (Verlag)
978-0-674-01591-3 (ISBN)

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Camp rejects the philosophical conceit that confusion is a kind of ambiguity; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. He proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science.

Everyone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph L. Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language can be classified as valid or invalid.

To the extent that philosophers have addressed this issue at all, they take it for granted that confusion is a kind of ambiguity. Camp rejects this notion; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning. Camp proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science.

Joseph L. Camp, Jr., was Professor of Philosophy and Fellow of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

I Material Falsity 1. Thinking One Thing Is Another 2. A Little History II What Confusion Is 3. Fred and the Ant Colony 4. The Semantic Use of Psychological Language III A Little Logic 5. Ambiguity 6. Humoring IV Truth-Valuing 7. Calibration 8. Failure to Refer 9. How You Convince People--Including Yourself--of the Theory of Descriptions 10. Trying to Predicate Existence V A Logic for Confusion 11. Explicating 12. Good Advice 13. How Fred Should Think VI Curing Confusion 14. Semantic Self-Awareness 15. Two Charleys 16. Young Newton VII Flexible Sameness 17. Self-Induced Confusion 18. The Theory of Ideas 19. Making Category Mistakes and Loving It Notes Index

Erscheint lt. Verlag	15.10.2004
Verlagsort	Cambridge, Mass
Sprache	englisch
Maße	144 x 227 mm
Gewicht	386 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
ISBN-10	0-674-01591-6 / 0674015916
ISBN-13	978-0-674-01591-3 / 9780674015913
Zustand	Neuware