Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-883331-4 (ISBN)
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe, and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include:
- traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc;
- new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism;
- foundational questions in decision-theory;
- confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology;
- topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology;
- topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions;
- work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony and the ethics of belief.
Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here.
Tamar Szabó Gendler is the Vincent J. Scully Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. John Hawthorne is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California.
1: David John Barnett: Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater
2: Jennifer Rose Carr: Subjective Probability and the Content/Attitude Distinction
3: Albert Casullo: Modal Empiricism: What is the Problem?
4: Sophie Horowitz: Accuracy and Educated Guesses
5: Jennifer Nado: Who Wants to Know?
6: Richard Pettigrew: On the Accuracy of Group Credences
7: Julia Staffel: Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism
8: Jonathan Vogel: Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism
9: Alex Worsnip: What to Believe About Your Belief that You're in the Good Case
10: Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne: Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes
11: Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath: Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment: a Reply to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne on Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes
12: Sanford C. Goldberg: Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking
13: Jeffrey Sanford Russell: How Much is at Stake for the Pragmatic Encroacher
| Erscheinungsdatum | 04.02.2019 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Oxford Studies in Epistemology ; 6 |
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 163 x 243 mm |
| Gewicht | 574 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie | |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-883331-8 / 0198833318 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-883331-4 / 9780198833314 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Haben Sie eine Frage zum Produkt? |
aus dem Bereich
